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Should scientists be permitted—even paid—to create new strains of 
flu virus that combine higher transmissibility with higher lethality 
than existing strains? The World Health Organization has already 
placed its imprimatur on the decision that they should. Should 
these new strains be widely shared around the globe among other 
interested scientists? The World Health Organization has already 
urged that they should. Does work with these strains require the 
highest level of bio-containment available? Not at all, insist those 
who work with the virus. Trust us, they say. 
The flu is miserable even in its ordinary versions. The flu can 
also kill. In some times and places, some strains of flu have killed 
millions of people (Ansart et al., 2009; US Department of Health 
and Human Services, n.d.). These scientists are thus asking us to 
trust them with our lives. A broad literature in science and health 
studies has already suggested many ways in which trust in the 
processes of public policy decision-making by scientific experts may 
not always be merited or sufficient (Koerber, 2013; Muhlberger et 
al., 2011; Paroske, 2012; Scott, 2002; Solomon, 2007), although 
there have also been thoughtful defenses of expert authority 
(Warren, 1996). This essay builds on these research strands by 
analyzing the role of facts and emotions in one globally important 
decision process. To do so, it offers a model of the relationship of 
logos and pathos as mentally-based, deliberative practices essential 
to public decision making. 
As a consequence of the conclusion of that analysis, the essay 
follows the dictates of an Isocratean theory of rhetoric to suggest an 
alternative process for global health decisions. It proposes that the 
internet now provides a tool for improving decision processes for 
global health concerns. It also provides guidelines for such an on-
line deliberation process derived from notes of caution offered by 
the existing research literature on public engagement with science 
policy. 
Because there are no public transcripts of the decision-making 
conference about the creation of the so-called “super-flu,” the 
analysis employs the published consensus texts and press 
conference for the WHO decision, published articles and statements 
by the lead scientists, and comments of National Science Advisory 
Board for Biosecurity personnel as evidence regarding the affective 
dimensions of the decision-making processes. 
HOW THE WORLD DECIDED ABOUT THE 
"SUPER-FLU" 
In 2011, teams of researchers from the US and the Netherlands, 
with funding from the US's National Institutes of Health, succeeded 
in creating a version of the H5N1 virus that could be transmitted 
among their test species (ferrets) through the air. The naturally 
occurring virus (formerly known as the "bird flu") had exhibited an 
alarmingly high fatality rate among those persons who were 
recorded as contracting it, but it had required direct contact for 
transmission. The media dubbed the new strains "super-flu" 
because the high potential fatality rate and enhanced 
transmissibility portended that their release would produce a 
pandemic with large numbers of fatalities. The US biosecurity 
board (National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity; NSABB) 
put a hold on the publication of the articles proposed for Nature 
and Science, which contained the methods for creating this new 
strain and details about it. The journals and authors agreed to 
comply, at least temporarily. 
Due to concerns about appropriate bio-containment and 
bioterrorism, in February 2012, the World Health Organization 
held a meeting to discuss the issue of data release, as well as the 
impact of this research on WHO's framework for disseminating 
research materials and vaccines globally. The WHO meeting to 
address this potentially threatening development included only 22 
invited participants, primarily authors and journal editors for the 
scientific research papers and select flu bioscientists or 
administrators of national flu research efforts. These narrowly 
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interested and expertised parties concluded that it was desirable to 
publish this research and to circulate the strains globally to enable 
more scientists around the world to do similar research. They 
conceded that someone should think about the bio-containment 
and bioterrorism issues and that the putatively inappropriate fears 
of the public should be calmed. The apparatus of classical rhetorical 
theory—with some updating—indicates that the bases that they 
offered for their decision rested in emotion as much as in facts or 
calculative reason. 
PATHOS AND LOGOS 
Aristotle initiated what is now a long line of inquiry into the 
empirical and normative questions surrounding the processes of 
public decision-making. His Rhetoric argued that human policy 
decisions are influenced by three types of “proofs”: ethos 
(character), pathos (emotion), and logos (rational inference). He 
offered little overt guidance about ethos, but he provided an 
empirically-based didactic discussion of the use of pathos, and he 
catalyzed the examination of logos that has been a signature focus 
of the Western academy for centuries. 
Explorations of Aristotle’s precise understanding of the concepts 
of logos and pathos remain contentious (e.g., Abizadeh, 2002; 
Fortenbaugh, 1975/2002; Garsten, 2006; Garver, 1994; Gross, 
2006; Gross & Dascal, 2001; Konstan, 2006; Koziak, 2000; Rorty, 
1984, 1996; Sokolon, 2006; Wisse, 1989). Moreover, the 
development of these concepts throughout the Western tradition 
has not been uniform or simple. In the contemporary period, there 
are at least two ways of treating logos, both of which have merit, 
and a variety of ways of treating pathos, most of which are 
studiously incomplete. A re-arrangement of the relationship of 
these two concepts is warranted by what we have learned about the 
human mind and about collective decision processes in the past few 
decades. 
Since Aristotle, the concept of logos has been developed in at 
least two separate flows. The first stream can be called calculative 
reason, the second argumentative deliberation. Calculative reason 
has been the touchstone of the sciences (natural and social) and of 
some branches of philosophy. Mathematics is one obvious 
component of the development of the technê of calculative reason. 
Aristotle’s elaboration of the syllogism was the first effort to develop 
such a technology for ordinary language. Symbolic logic evolved 
from this effort. Computer programming is a further elaboration of 
this version of a technology for logos. The two key features of 
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calculative reason are linearity and the stability of variables. That 
the stability of the variables is crucial to a syllogism is enshrined in 
Aristotle's famous dictum: "B" is either "A" or "not A" but not both. 
Likewise, the underlying assumption of a mathematical equation is 
that a particular formula repeatedly gives a particular set of 
outcomes for each particular variable value. Although both 
syllogisms and mathematical equations are abstractions that are to 
be "filled in" by different values, the functioning of the reason-
format is dependent both on the fixity that the format provides per 
value and on the assumption that the variables do not change their 
value as the format is executed. This stipulation is tied to the second 
assumption, that the equations are "linear" in the sense that they do 
not require repeated re-adjustment of component parts to each 
other. Once each component has been executed, it is not revisited; it 
simply contributes its output to the next stage (as in a sorites or a 
serial computer program or as parentheses specify the necessary 
order for processing the component parts of a mathematical 
equation). This set of assumptions enables calculative reason to 
offer the pleasing reassurance of certainty and universality (because 
it offers absolute repeatability, where non-repeatability can be 
assigned to error). 
These guarantees of certainty and universality are highly desired 
for decision- making. Unfortunately, this kind of reasoning is not of 
use in any pragmatic application where the variables and 
relationships among variables are not stable or definitively 
categorizable. In the realm of policy-making, contention often 
arises and endures at least in part because these conditions are not 
met. Consequently, in the late twentieth century, studies in 
argumentation led by scholars such as Chaim Perelman, Stephen 
Toulmin, and Douglas Ehninger sought to develop an approach to 
public policy that retained as much of the core traits of calculative 
reason as possible but with loosened parameters that might fit the 
nature of the variables and changeable relationships that occur in 
much real public decision-making. 
The wide-spread application of Toulmin’s Claim-Ground-
Warrant formulations in courses dedicated to practical 
argumentation illustrates well the line of approach toward what is 
sometimes called “informal reasoning” or informal logic and its 
appeal and potential applications. There remains, nonetheless, a 
clear disjunction between these approaches and calculative reason. 
The formulas employed in mathematics and syllogistic reasoning 
are rigorously deduced and universal. One need only plug in 
variables, and the formulas dictate the outcomes (by a circular 
definition, as Toulmin noted). In contrast, the technê of 
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argumentative deliberation provides a vocabulary and an 
abstracting template for reifying and assessing the reasoning in 
arguments, but it does not dictate outcomes; novel work that is not 
fixed by the formulas must still be done by the human agents 
making the assessments. This form of logos not only cannot offer 
universal certainty, but it also cannot offer a pre-determined 
endpoint. It is obvious when a calculation is complete—all the 
prescribed operations of the program or sorites or equation have 
been done (once, in the proper order). In contrast, an 
argumentative deliberation is complete only when its engagers 
agree that it is, or when they give up on the possibility of 
agreement. 
The utility of argumentative deliberation as a technê of logos is 
simultaneously a taken-for-granted of much democratic theory and 
also is widely suspect. Its strongest support comes from the 
observation that, taken on the whole, deliberation engages the 
possibility of incorporating the maximal range and numbers of 
factors and perspectives into any decision. Suspicion arises 
precisely because it is not identical to calculative reason. Although 
particular human characteristics (“pooling of biases” Lu et al., 
2012) and situational factors (exclusion of relevant parties) mean 
that this form of deliberation doesn’t always produce a better 
decision than instinctual responses, its potential to do so warrants 
the study of this kind of logos in an effort to maximize the potential 
embedded in the technology of argumentative deliberation. 
PATHOS  
After Aristotle, the championing of the possibilities and vision of 
calculative reason led to a variety of placements of pathos. 
Sometimes emotion was designated as something that needed to be 
repressed in order to allow logos to exercise its sway. Sometimes it 
was subordinated to logos, as in George Campbell’s formula: “Logic 
therefore forges the arms which eloquence teacheth us to wield; we 
must first have recourse to the former” (Philosophy of Rhetoric, 
56). It was also often relegated to the fine arts (wherein academic 
sensibilities transmuted and tamed it by sublimating it within terms 
such as “taste” or “aesthetics” or “imagination”). In the last thirty 
years, however, social scientific, neuroscientific, and humanistic 
work on emotion has demonstrated that emotion is not the opposite 
of reason (see e.g., Allen et al., 2011; Decety, Echols, & Correll, 
2009; Grossberg, 1997; Nussbaum, 2001). Strikingly, most human 
decision—making turns out to require emotion (Damasio, 2006). 
Although computers can spit out desirable answers without 
emotions, the evidence indicates that the human mind is largely 
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incapable of doing so with regard to situated pragmatic decisions. 
Emotion has evolved because it enabled good human decision-
making. It is a brain-based process, just as calculation and 
argumentative deliberation are. As with our nascent capacities for 
logos, therefore, it should be possible to develop technologies for 
improving upon these nascent capacities. 
In order to understand the most promising lines for such 
development, it is useful to understand how logos and pathos differ 
as mental processes.1 The ideal of calculative reason is linear, 
totalistic, and fixed. Emotion is non-linear, probabilistic, and 
iterative. This is well-illustrated and supported by the frame-and-
experiment created by Melissa Finucane et al. (2000). Their work 
builds on research into the processing of risks and benefits in 
human decision-making, which has identified a substantial series of 
species- typical variations from a strict calculative approach that 
guide human judgments. Humans, for example, are subject to 
anchoring effects and imaginability effects. We prefer a surer bet 
over a less likely one even where this would produce a substantial 
net loss over repeated trials. If one operates from the perspective of 
calculative models of logos, these processes must be viewed as 
"biases" or as "skewed" from the ideal. To see them as something 
other than a deviation from the logos-based ideal, it helps to have 
an alternative ideal. 
Finucane and colleagues offer such an alternative. They argue 
that affect-based decision-making occurs through a process of 
constant re-adjustment of the values of all input variables to each 
other via an intermediary global variable (which they label affect). 
To establish the plausibility of their model, they performed an 
experiment in which they altered the information people had about 
risks or benefits and then measured the change in the participants' 
evaluation of the risks and of the benefits. Specifically, they gave 
participants information indicating that a technology was either 
high in benefit, low in benefit, high in risk, or low in risk. 
1 I would prefer to say “cognitive processes” but the field of 
neuro-psychology has become accustomed to assigning the term 
“cognition” to a specific set of brain circuits. The assignment was 
probably originally based on the claim that emotion is an involuntary 
process whereas cognition is voluntary (e.g., Allen et al., 2011; Dolcos et 
al., 2011). Given the extensive studies in emotion regulation and the fact 
that the functions of cognition for most people are not actually executed 
in a voluntary way, this seems like a faulty basis for distinction. However, 
for now these categories reign. 
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They posited that "If people consult their overall affective 
evaluation of an item (say, nuclear power) when judging its risk 
and benefit, then raising or lowering the favorability of the 
affective impression should alter both the risk and benefit 
judgments derived from that impression." In contrast, given a 
logos-based model, changing the risk judgment should not change 
the benefit judgment and changing the benefit judgment should 
not change the risk judgment, as these should be two independent 
variables. The experiment is therefore an excellent test of the 
model. 
The experimental results supported the predictions of the affect 
model, albeit adding additional complexity:2 the participants 
tended to adjust their estimate of risks when given information 
about benefits and vice versa. The model has also been supported 
by a rapid accumulation of other psychological and, more recently, 
behavioral economic, and political science research (e.g., Alford and 
Hibbing, 2004; Haidt, 2012; Lerner et al., 2003; Westen, 2007). 
Gradually, the black box that Finucane et al. dubbed "affect" is 
being filled in by the specification of the particular ways in which 
different regions and "circuits" of the brain operate in processing 
that is not simply linear calculation (e.g., Decety, Echols, & Correll, 
2009; Leuthold et al., 2012; Vytal and Hamann, 2009). It is clear 
that this kind of model predicts how humans typically "think" or 
"decide" far better than does the older model of calculative reason. 
There are detailed arguments that one can make as to why this 
kind of decision- making is superior to merely calculative reason for 
many important uses; Alford and Hibbing (2004) have called it 
"more than rational" processing. Rather than repeating their 
argument, I believe it more useful to develop the concrete case and 
practical proposal. Suffice it to say that affective reasoning 1) allows 
the rapid inter-adjustment of social, value, and empirical 
components to decisions, and 2) was at least "good enough" to 
allow humans to survive for millenia before what we think of as the 
technê of calculative reason began to be rigorously developed. 
Affective processing, therefore, should hardly be dismissed as 
"irrational" and undesirable. We might nonetheless seek to improve 
2 These complexities included 1) the difficulty of changing the 
target sense of benefit/risk; 2) differences among the four conditions of 
high/low benefit, and high/low risk in their level of impact, and 3) 
interactions with the particularities of a given topic (e.g., nuclear power 
vs. natural gas vs. food preservatives). These complexities, although not 
explicitly predicted by Finucane et al., are consistent with the affect-based 
model and inconsistent with a logos-based model. 
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upon it by developing technologies for extending its capacities and 
avoiding those features that might give it a penchant for certain 
kinds of errors. Such a trajectory seems more desirable than an 
ever-widening split between a social media where emotions run rife 
without any deliberation and a technical sphere that suppresses 
signs of emotion on the mistaken assumption that doing so enables 
calculative reason to provide answers to non-calculable problems. 
In seeking a route for developing a theory of pathos as a 
component of public decision-making, the parallels between 
affective processing as an individual-level phenomenon and 
argumentative deliberation as a public process are instructive. Both 
feature iteration, parallel activity, and on-going adjustments of 
inputs. This suggests that a possibly fruitful line of development lies 
in specifying affective processing as a component of public 
deliberation. If the analogy with argumentative deliberation is 
taken prescriptively, this would mean that an ideal for public 
deliberation would include at least two components: active 
reflection on the emotive components of deliberations and 
inclusion of the maximal possible range of relevant affective 
weightings and inputs.3 Such a line of development would need to 
attend to and compensate for the proclivity of emotion to be short-
term, partisan, and relational in order to formulate specific didactic 
theories and prescriptions. For present purposes, however, the 
above description provides a sufficient apparatus for exploring the 
bases of the decision to propagate a super-flu. The public texts by 
the interested parties who were empowered to make those decisions 
show 1) that the scientists themselves utilized affective processing 
in their risk estimations, and 2) that they actively excluded the 
emotions of others from the decision- making process. 
1st Proof: Affective-style Processing by the Flu-Creating Scientists 
One key difference between affective-style mental processing 
(addressed in pathos) and calculative processing (addressed in 
logos) is the context-dependence of the former and the stipulated 
universality of the latter. Because calculative reasoning presumes 
stability of variables and linearity of processing, it is context-
independent. Because affective reasoning produces different 
outputs (in this case, judgments) depending on the mutual 
3 The inclusion of the possibilities for reflection on facts and 
calculative bases of decisions and the inclusion of all the (available) 
relevant facts and calculations seem to be the least controversial and 
minimal conditions of argumentative deliberative ideals, though there 
are other proposed factors such as sincerity or particular content or 
relational components. 
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sensitivity of variables to each others' values, it is context sensitive. 
Both the public statements by key scientists involved in creating the 
new flu virus and the evidence we have about the papers the 
scientists wrote display the shifting of the value of input variables in 
different contexts that is the hallmark of affective processing. These 
shifts cannot be attributed to changes in measured variables (the 
only possibility in the case of calculative reason). In fact, none of 
the data regarding the new flu or bio-safety factors changed during 
the time that these changes in statements were made. What 
changed was the context. As discussions proceeded in different 
venues, it became more or less advantageous to have a higher or 
lower intuitive estimate of the transmissibility or fatality rate of the 
flu. This adjustment of variable values to contextual variables is, by 
the definition offered above, affective-style processing. 
Ron Fouchier was a lead researcher in the Netherlands-based 
laboratory that participated in the creation of the new flu and was 
the most active spokesperson for the laboratories involved. A 
reporter for Science first identified changes in Fouchier’s expressed 
judgments about the riskiness of the new flu (Cohen, 9 March 
2012). Jon Cohen reported that in November of 2011, before the 
controversy arose, Fouchier called the mutated virus, "Probably one 
of the most dangerous viruses you can make.” Cohen also noted 
that Fouchier was quoted in The Influenza Times as having said 
that, “This is very bad news, indeed," and having claimed that the 
virus was as transmissible as the seasonal virus. In contrast, once a 
high level of risk had become a block to the publication of the 
research rather than a rationale for its importance and future 
funding, the Science reporter noted that Fouchier reduced his 
estimate of the risks. Cohen reported that "Fouchier criticized press 
accounts that suggested, as he put it, that 'this virus would spread 
like wildfire if it would come out of our facility'"(1555), and further 
that, "'We have to conclude that this virus does not spread yet like a 
pandemic or seasonal influenza virus,' Fouchier said, in contrast to 
what he reportedly said in Malta. He did not respond to Science’s 
request to discuss this discrepancy" (1155-1156). 
Fouchier's statements display input variable sensitivity even 
within a narrower time frame. In one context he emphasized the 
surprising nature of the results. A New York Times story recounted 
the moment of the discovery of the capacities of the newly created 
virus. A junior scientist in Fouchier’s lab reportedly had gone to 
Fouchier saying, “'You are not going to believe this one....I think we 
have an airborne H5N1 virus.” Fouchier explained that, “We both 
needed a beer to recover from the shock” (Grady & McNeil, 26 
December 2011). In another interview, however, Fouchier portrayed 
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the creation of the virus not as a surprise, but as the planned result 
of a carefully designed project: “This experiment was not designed 
overnight. We started planning for these experiments 10 years ago, 
consulting with experts nationally and internationally about how to 
do this safely. We built special facilities to protect people against 
the virus and the virus against the people" (Carvajal, 21 December 
2011). 
Fouchier's judgments of whether the flu is highly threatening or 
a less serious risk, a surprising development or a predictable 
outcome of planned manipulations, were evidently dependent on 
the values of other variables (which depended in turn on contexts). 
Although we can't know these other unstated variables with 
certainty, the contexts indicate that the relevant variables are the 
publicity advantages for Fouchier's alliance. When it is 
advantageous for the risks to appear high—because high risk 
justifies funding or publication in high-profile journals—then the 
risks are estimated as high and the discovery portrayed as shocking. 
When the public concern about the experiments makes it 
disadvantageous for the risks to be high or the scientists to portray 
themselves as surprised by developments, the risks are judged to be 
lower and more predictable. 
One might portray Fouchier simply as a loose canon, but the 
available evidence indicates that the same pattern was true of the 
scientific papers themselves. The original papers have not to date 
been released, but the members of the NSABB who read both 
versions of the papers—the versions submitted before the public 
controversy and the revised versions submitted after the 
controversy—testify that the papers changed the portrayals of the 
risks. Cohen and Malakoff quote NSABB member Lynn Enquist as 
saying, ‘The original papers were typical Science and Nature 
papers: very brief, short on detailed discussion, little to no 
information on biosafety/biosecurity/mitigation, and perhaps even 
a little sensational,’ says NSABB member Lynn Enquist.” They also 
quote NSABB member Michael Imperiale, who uses the "rational 
not emotional" formula when he concludes, “All parties agree that 
the longer, revised paper presented last week was clearer. It 
presents the data ‘in a more rational manner'" (Cohen & Malakoff, 6 
April 2012). The scientists displayed adjustment of key input 
variables to other variables; the shift demonstrates that the key 
judgments of risk were based on affective, not calculative processes. 
As a secondary proof of the emotionality of the scientists one 
might turn to the intensity of the statements. More traditional 
accounts of emotion as well as some post- structural ones treat 
intensity as either a sign of emotion or as its core feature (e.g. 
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Massumi,, 2002). The scientists displayed such intensity, for 
example, when they wrote that "As we compare the current threat 
posed by bioterrorism and our past experience with the threat of 
influenza, we would argue that nature itself should be considered 
the prime bioterrorist" (Fouchier, Herfst, & Osterhaus, 10 February 
2012, p. 663). 
The conclusion that the scientists were engaged in affective 
processing should not automatically be interpreted as a 
condemnation. The synthetic position on logos and pathos being 
offered here insists that pragmatic human decisions, especially 
complex ones, will typically be made through such affective 
processing. Scientists would not be human if they made decisions 
otherwise. The evidence only highlights that it is naïve to imagine 
that scientists could make decisions based solely on a calculation of 
the facts in such cases. This conclusion mandates, instead, 
assigning a greater importance to ensuring that the emotional 
processing that occurs in public decision-making incorporate the 
sensitivities and feelings of all affected and knowledgeable parties, 
not merely a narrowly weighted slice. Once one understands 
affective processing as (in part) the mutual adjustment of a 
maximal number of relevant variables to each other, then the 
criterion of maximum participation becomes not merely a desired 
quality on extrinsic grounds, but an operational requirement for 
optimal decisions as a matter of fact. 
2nd PROOF: EXCLUDING FEAR FROM THE DELIBERATIVE 
PROCESS As a matter of course, those empowered to make policy 
routinely presume the superiority of their own decision processes 
over others. In this case, that superiority was explicitly promoted 
through the denigration of the emotions of others, which 
presumably served to deny their legitimate inclusion in the 
decision-making processes. The available texts on the decision 
processes include statements by the scientists and official 
statements of the World Health Organization. These repeatedly 
portray the emotions of others (especially the public, but also those 
with different expertise) as an impediment to be overcome rather 
than as resources that should be included to broaden the 
deliberation. Fear was a particular target for exclusion. 
If one takes seriously the utility of the experience of fear as a 
component of decision-making processes, excluding fear is bound 
to produce bad judgment. Fear is not per se irrational. If one 
doesn’t experience fear in the face of a serious threat, then one is 
less likely to act appropriately. Empirical research on fear shows 
that it consists of a two- phase process. In the first phase, which is 
dedicated to assessment, one’s attention becomes tightly focused on 
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the potentially threatening stimulus. Priority is given to the 
gathering and assessment of relevant information. If the 
assessment confirms a threat rather than a false alarm and if it 
confirms that the threat can’t be addressed efficaciously by attack 
(in which case anger may be triggered instead), then a set of 
physiological responses is generally launched that enhance rapid 
execution of a particular range of action plans (e.g., withdrawal or 
flight (Moons et al., 2010), displays of social submission (Ohman, 
2009), or probability neglect (Nielsen & Shapiro, 2009)). 
Fear thus plays a crucial role in any decision regarding threat 
assessment, but it plays that role in conjunction with other 
emotions. A classic analysis of decision-making based in fear is the 
example of a deer approaching a water pond. As it approaches, the 
deer constantly assesses potential threats, experiencing early phase 
fear responses. As long as these remain low-level, the beneficial 
appeal of the water is strong enough to keep the deer moving 
forward. When the threat becomes too great, the deer freezes or 
flees. In contrast to such basic physiological response patterns, 
human rhetorical processes enable deliberation upon threats and 
benefits and these can be weighed against each other in an extended 
time and space. This also enables conscious option creation and 
selection. To exclude fear processing from public deliberation 
would therefore be to exclude consideration of what might be valid 
threats to well-being and the broadest possible range of action 
options. Additionally, at the public level, benefits and risks are 
distributed differently to different groups. The career and curiosity 
benefits to lab scientists creating flus is additional to whatever 
health benefits they might share in common with others, and those 
benefits are much more certain and proximal (which is crucial to 
emotional intensity). Likewise with the benefits of publication for 
journal editors. The best public decision requires therefore that the 
emotional weighting processes of the widest possible range of those 
affected be included in the decision process. 
In contrast, seeking to narrow the inputs, the pro-flu-creation 
alliance routinely portrayed their judgments as solid and factual 
and the emotions of others as extraneous— a regrettable 
impediment to be managed. For example, a letter by the scientists 
published in Nature explained their agreement to go along with the 
publication moratorium imposed by the NSABB in this way: 
“Despite the positive public-health benefits these studies sought to 
provide, a perceived fear that the ferret-transmissible H5 HA 
viruses may escape from the laboratories has generated intense 
public debate in the media on the benefits and potential harm of 
this type of research…" (Fouchier et al., "Pause," 27 January 2012, 
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400; my emphasis). This quotation takes for granted that the 
research has positive public-health benefits (or that having such 
intents is sufficient to counter risks and that this justifies the 
creation of the risks) and that the risks on the other side are only 
emotionally based (mis)perceptions. By treating their own 
judgments of benefit as fact and the judgments of others as merely 
emotions (“perceived fears”), they actively preclude the need to 
deliberate the matter with others. Notice how this formula depends 
on the idea that emotions are irrational and inutile, whereas facts 
and reason are the sole component necessary for decision-making. 
The errant theory of emotion and reason upon which we have been 
operating for several centuries is therein deployed rhetorically and 
is consequential. 
These same patterns manifest themselves in the documents 
produced by the WHO meeting February 16 & 17, 2012. In the press 
conference that presented and promoted the group's conclusions, 
the designated spokesperson described the problem as one of 
misplaced public emotion—unnecessary anxieties. Consequently, 
the appropriate policy approach would be to increase "awareness" 
on the part of the public of the positive benefits of the research 
(intensify one of the input variables) rather than to change any 
scientific funding or procedures: 
Well, they recognize that right now there is a lot of 
concern about the safety aspects of this kind of research 
and the safety aspects of these particular studies and the 
newly created lab modified viruses. So it was recognized 
that it was important that public awareness and 
awareness of other groups about the nature of the 
research, the importance of the research and the context 
of the research be understood and that this was the most 
important step for making sure that anxieties would not 
be unnecessarily increased (Fukuda, 17 February 2012). 
Remarkably, in this statement safety “concerns” are not treated as 
part of the inputs for deciding on whether or not the research 
should be published and go forward. Instead, because the scientists 
themselves don’t feel these concerns, they are treated as external to 
the decision process. Their stance is that the feelings of others do 
not have to be incorporated in the decision process; they just have 
to be managed outside the decision to gain support for it or enable 
it. Notably, the scientists indicate that this can be done by making 
others more aware of the benefits. In other words, the projected 
action is to increase the public’s sense of one of the input variables 
with a positive valence for the scientists’ preferred activities, rather 
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than to incorporate the negative input variable(s) into the decision 
process. 
This statement echoed the official WHO Consensus Statement. 
The Consensus also declared that the decision had been made based 
on the benefits and relegated the risks to the realm of the “social” 
rather than to what it described as the realm of public health. If 
safety concerns existed, they should be applied to mitigate the risks 
once they were taken, they should not be incorporated into a 
decision about whether such risks should continue to be created: 
There is a preference, from a public health perspective, 
for full disclosure of the information in these papers. 
However, there are significant social concerns 
surrounding this research. Two critical issues that must 
be addressed before publication of the papers are: (1) a 
focused communications plan to increase public 
awareness and understanding of the significance of these 
studies and the rationale for their publication, and (2) a 
review of the essential biosafety and biosecurity aspects 
of the newly developed knowledge (WHO, Technical 
Consultation, 16-17 February, 2012). 
During the press conference, Laurie Garrett (a journalist and Senior 
Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations) challenged this 
representation, saying “If I understand right, basically the scientists 
all feel that what they are doing is safe and reasonable but they 
think that the public is hysterical so they want to delay everything 
until WHO and other unnamed agencies have calmed the public 
down and informed them so that the scientists can go forward. Is 
that correct?” The spokesperson denied that this was what was 
meant, saying that the safety questions are difficult ones, but he 
then returns to the same formula that sets the safety concerns as 
things others have and that are not legitimately part of the decision 
process. The decision remains unaffected by these risks but “rather 
than just plough ahead and ignore those concerns the group felt 
that one of the things that would be important to do would be to try 
to increase public awareness about these studies.” “Concerns” are 
again simply the feelings of others that can be addressed by “greater 
awareness” of the benefits. He even offers the decision-makers as a 
model for how the public would respond to this greater awareness, 
recounting how having their awareness of the studies increased led 
to their decision in favor of furthering this work. Such a prediction 
is unreliable. Because the decision makers were so differently 
placed from most of the other humans in the global public in terms 
of the impact of potential benefits and the threat of potential risks 
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these people cannot serve as surrogate deliberators for the public. 
They are also limited in their expertise. 
WHO/WHO DECIDED?  
The 22 people invited to make this potentially momentous decision 
on behalf of the 7 billion people in the world included (according to 
the biographies published by the WHO) 2 journal editors from 
Nature and Science, 3 authors of the papers, 7 directors of WHO flu 
centers, 6 representatives of national governments (3 from the US, 
2 from the Netherlands, 1 from Indonesia), 2 WHO representatives 
(from the PIP board, which had previously prioritized global 
dispersal of research opportunities), 1 other scientist, and 1 ethicist. 
Even within the old-fashioned paradigm in which logos alone 
suffices for decision-making, biosecurity experts should have been 
well represented at this conference. Fouchier himself had 
recognized that group as central contributors to the debate. In an 
interview he opined, 
The only people who want to hold back are the 
biosecurity experts. They show zero tolerance to risk. 
The public health specialists do not have this zero 
tolerance. I have not spoken to a single public health 
specialist who was against publication. So we are going 
to see an interesting debate over the next few weeks 
between biosecurity experts and public health experts 
who think this information should be in the public 
domain. (Carvajal, 21 December, 2011). 
Paul Keim was the only individual whom the WHO-provided 
biography represents as a bio-safety or biosecurity expert, except 
for the representative of the Netherlands government, who had 
already publically proclaimed his support for the Dutch research 
team. If one were looking for a thorough discussion of the risks vs. 
benefits, this is not the group of people one would invite to such a 
deliberation. 
Even the “public health specialists” who were invited did not 
represent the full range of relevant expertise or a balanced sample 
of relevant specialties. As Table 1 shows, and the debate in the 
public media further suggested, the relevant concerns for assessing 
risks and benefits would include experts in field research, statistical 
modelers of epidemics, medical resource specialists, and those 
scientists actively working on the “general” flu vaccine, which NIH 
had been funding and which was reportedly near clinical testing 
(Koebler, 13 January 2012). The overwhelming majority of 
participants had instead been trained as clinical or bench scientists, 
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though they also represented the perspectives of vaccine producers. 
For example, Nancy J. Cox was a Director of the Influenza Division 
at the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and thus a 
public health expert. But her doctoral degree was in genetics and 
her unit was involved in “isolation of candidate seasonal vaccine 
viruses in eggs and from Novartis for analysis of viruses isolated in 
tissue cultures.” Anne Kelsow was also a director of a WHO Center 
and thus describable as a “public health expert,” but she had done 
research on T cell immunity and reported holding shares in a 
pharmaceutical company that produces influenza vaccines. Willem 
Luytjes was described as the “first to genetically modify influenza 
virus (published 1989).” Le Quynh Mai “played a key role in 
characterizing this influenza virus.” On the clinical side, Professor 
Didier Houssin had impressive public health credentials, but he was 
described as a “liver surgery and transplant specialist.” 
 
Table 1: Arguments For And Against Research to Create 
More Transmissible Flu Viruses in Informed Public 
Discussions* 
 For the Research Against the Research 
Surveillance Uses *We can identify mutations 
occurring in the field that 
may become problematic 
*Surveillance is impractical in nations 
where flu presents highest risks 
Bioterrorist Uses *Lethality not certain 
*Terrorists couldn't make it 
*Other organisms are more 
weaponizable 
*Recorded lethality is v. high 
*Terrorists have proven v. 
inventive/capable 
*Your planned research makes it more 
lethal 
Bio-containment *Our Bio-containment is 
good 
*Historical pattern of escapes 
*Level 3 too low 
Vaccines *Will help create new 
vaccines 
*All research good! 
*Vaccines not related to transmission 
mechanisms 
*Vaccine dissemination is the problem 
*Weak track record of products 
*Universal Vaccine Closer 
Government Role *Government censorship 
bad 
*Analogy to airline security 
   
*Government should not/can not fund 
every possible research 
See esp. "Sunday Dialogue" (2012) 
The overwhelming majority of these participants were in some 
way likely to benefit directly from publication of this research and 
further funding of such research. The definition of “expertise” as 
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those who had the closest technical knowledge to the proposed 
publication of a piece of lab research is common in scientific 
communities. However, in public policy it is an inappropriate 
criterion because it excludes both those who have the full range of 
relevant technical knowledge and those who would weigh the 
factors involved through emotive processing set to substantially 
different valences for the relative risks and benefits.  
Given the narrow representation in the decision process, there 
was virtually no chance that the affectively based judgments that 
the pro-research partisans carried into the meeting would be 
modulated by other affects and data. Thus, it is not surprising that a 
small and at least partially inappropriate set of affective preferences 
simply got certified as WHO official conclusions. Emotions, 
however, are never static. Assembling a group of people with shared 
affects often heightens the affects that they share in common. In 
this case, such sharing produced not only an unreliable “yes” or 
“no” decision but created additional courses of action that would 
increase the risks. 
SHARING OUR BENEFITS/EXPANDING THEIR 
RISKS  
The WHO was careful to insist that the February meeting should 
address only the issue of publication of the research results of the 
existing study, and that a larger meeting should later address the 
broader issues pertaining to the conduct of such research itself. This 
is not, however, what the meeting did. The first statement in the 
Consensus document explicitly endorsed the research itself and its 
continuation: "Research on these viruses, including on 
transmissibility and pathogenicity, remains critical to close 
important gaps in knowledge in order to reduce the danger posed; 
such research should continue" (WHO Headquarters, Consensus 
Points). The WHO thus pronounced that the risks of accidental 
release and bioterrorism are outweighed (not even mentionable) by 
the “danger posed” by the potential of a future, naturally occurring 
mutation. 
The document exceeds its mandate even further, in ways not 
imagined by anyone prior to the meeting, and literally 
unimaginable in a context of a weighing of risks and benefits. It 
urges the global dispersal of the research: "Future research projects 
should involve countries from which source material were 
obtained." The WHO decision endorsed the global dispersal of the 
bio-containment risks and an expansion of the bioterrorism risks. 
This seems a shocking dictate at this time given that even the WHO 
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document recognized that public debate had arisen due to bio-
containment and bioterrorism concerns, and even it had conceded 
that "a review" of these concerns was necessitated even if they 
might by addressed only as remediation prospects. 
Table 2: Deaths from H5N1 and WHO Meeting Participants 
By Country 
Country Number of WHO Meeting 
Participants (Country as Listed 
in Official Biography) 
Laboratory Confirmed 
Deaths from H5N1 
2003–2012 
Australia 1 0 
Azerbaijan  5 
Cambodia  17 
China 2 (1 Hong Kong) 28 
Egypt  59 
France 1 0 
Great Britain 2 0 
Indonesia 3 156 
Iraq  2 
Japan 2 0 
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.  2 
Netherlands 4 0 
Nigeria  1 
Pakistan  1 
South Africa 1 0 
Thailand  17 
Turkey  4 
United States of 
 
5 0 
Vietnam 1 61 
 
The endorsement of dispersal arose both from the affective 
context of the WHO itself and in particular from the affective 
preferences of several of the participants. With regard to the broad 
context, WHO is appropriately concerned with global equity. The 
recorded death toll from avian influenza was highest in Indonesia, 
Viet Nam, Egypt, China, Cambodia, and Thailand and essentially nil 
in the Western world where the research was being done (see Table 
2: World Health Organization, "Cumulative Number," 2 April 
2012). Secondly, with regard to specific participants, the official 
representatives of WHO at the meeting had been active in 
formulating WHO policies that urge equalization of research 
capacities and full access to flu vaccines around the world (WHO, 
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, 2011). Additionally, some of the 
directors of centers of flu expertise hailed from countries other than 
the US and the Netherlands. They predictably desired access to the 
research materials (the mutated viruses) for their own laboratories 
or scientists. 
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One should definitely endorse the fairer distribution of vaccines 
around the globe, as the WHO's "PIP" framework encourages. One 
might also reasonably endorse the fairer distribution of research 
capacities around the world to cultures that want to participate in 
this type of research endeavor. But prioritizing dispersal of an air- 
transmissible flu virus with a high fatality rate among multiple 
laboratories in the face of unsettled concerns about bio-
containment and bioterrorism seems to qualify prima facie as an 
egalitarianism among the worlds' elites at the cost of the greater 
proportion of the world's peoples, at least in the short term. The 
WHO meeting's decision to prioritize that goal reveals just how 
thorough the individual affective priorities were in shaping the 
consensus statement. Everyone present in the conference room had 
their desires articulated in the consensus document; the flu 
researchers got an endorsement of their research, the journals and 
authors got an endorsement of their publication of the research, the 
WHO got to forward its understanding of its global research equity 
interests. But—and this matters a tremendous amount—the 
unknown affective reasoning of the overwhelming majority of the 
world's peoples, with their full range of expertise and risk 
valuations, were not articulated in the decision processes and so 
were absent from the consensus statement. 
AFTER THE WHO CONFERENCE  
In the face of the WHO decision, the US’s NSABB changed its mind 
and in a split vote endorsed publication of the research. Revised 
versions of the scientific papers have now been published. US 
officials made tepid statements about increased monitoring of "dual 
use" research, but this monitoring was left in the sequestered hands 
of those who had previously failed to identify this research as 
problematic. WHO claims to have enacted its "public awareness" 
campaign (WHO, Update, 29 May 2012). There is no public 
evidence that it initiated the review of biosafety and containment 
that it recommended as a prerequisite to publication. The short 
time interval precludes the possibility that even a non-public review 
of any thoroughness was conducted prior to publication. The 
research establishment moves ahead using millions of public 
dollars in efforts to create novel, more highly transmissible, highly 
virulent viruses in level 3 containment facilities. 
A noteworthy but largely unnoticed event has occurred in the 
interim. As has been periodically the case throughout the US and 
Western Europe, a major problem with the effectiveness of a bio-
containment facility was identified in June of 2012. As AP reporters 
discovered, the US's Centers for Disease Control itself has (once 
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again) proven unable to maintain bio-containment. USA Today 
reported that "A $214 million bioterror germ lab at the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta has had repeated 
problems with airflow systems designed to help prevent the release 
of infectious agents, government documents and internal e-mails 
show" (Young, Airflow problems plague CDC bioterror lab, 13 June 
2012). The report revealed a long-term pattern of complaints by 
scientists about the adequacy of biosafety at the facility. US officials 
insisted that nothing dangerous escaped and no one was harmed. 
But if the CDC cannot maintain these facilities successfully, should 
concerns about bio-containment in the laboratories of the world be 
deferred while such research continues? Are the benefits of flu 
research that creates new mutants really so great that such risks 
should be encouraged? 
This essay cannot answer that question. Perhaps the 22 carefully 
selected experts made the right decision for the world. If so, 
however, they did so by accident, not because they employed the 
correct calculations or engaged in rational deliberations 
appropriate to the question. As Table 3 indicates, such a calculative 
process would have been impossible; most of the variables are 
unknown and not calculable. Of equal importance, however, 
humans cannot make this kind of decision through calculation 
alone. They must use their affective capacities in a collective, 
deliberative fashion, and the affective capacities of this group were 
too narrow for the task. 
Table 3: Some Variables Required for a Calculative 
Comparison of Risks vs. Benefits of Research Creating H5N1 
Flu Strains With Enhanced Transmissibility 
 A. Biocontainment Risk Levels: 
 Likelihood of Accidental Release From Level 3 (or 4) Facilities 
over X Timeframe (PIP Global Dispersal Ideal vs. Limited Sharing 
Model) 
 Likelihood of “Amateur” Production of Virus From Published 
Data and Accidental Release 
 Probability of Dispersal Patterns in Various Scenarios 
=Death and Illness “Probability Costs” 
B. Bioterrorism Risk Levels: 
Likelihood of Terroristic Access to Level 3 or 4 Containment Facilities 
(and transit) 
 Likelihood of Terroristic Production from Published Data 
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 Probablity of Dispersal Patterns in Various Scenarios 
 Death/serious illness rates 
= Increased Costs of Monitoring + Probability Costs in 
Death and Illness 
C. Benefit Levels: 
 Likelihood per Time Unit of Discovering Useable Vaccine 
(Useable= economic, acceptable secondary effects, acceptable level of 
protection: all TBSpecified) 
 Predicted Achievement of Dispersal of Vaccine Over Scenario 
Coverage Areas in Relevant Time Frame 
=Probability Benefits of Utilizing Vaccine 
A BETTER WAY TO DECIDE GLOBAL HEALTH 
ISSUES  
Theory-building and critical analysis are widely accepted 
components of published essays in the contemporary Western 
academy. Recently, however, there has been increasing 
encouragement from many quarters for scholars to move beyond 
negative critique toward positive recommendations. One such 
nascent school identifies this work as a revivification of the 
Isocratean tradition of rhetorical studies. Leah Ceccarelli (2011) and 
Marita Gronnvoll and Jamie Landau (2010), among others, suggest 
that the scholar’s task does not properly end with analysis or 
critique. If a better alternative cannot be offered, then a critique 
may be misleading as to merit or self-serving rather than 
constructive of positive social changes to which its putative 
audience would agree. Ceccarrelli and Gronvoll & Landau have 
respectively offered improved argumentative strategies and 
preferred metaphors as a component of their scholarly essays. 
Given the recent infusion of media theory into rhetorical studies, 
some rhetoricians may also be well schooled to offer suggestions for 
alternative media and communicative processes as well. 
Working from that frame, the analysis above encourages the 
following proposal. The WHO should terminate the use of small 
closed-door meetings for decision-making on all cases of species-
creation or other border-spanning health issues. Such meetings 
inevitably certify the narrow affects of highly interested parties as 
official policies. Instead, WHO should establish a global, open-
access deliberation process via the internet. Such a process will 
place experts of multiple backgrounds in public discussion with the 
general public. Decisions can thereby utilize the human capacities 
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for both logos and pathos to incorporate the broadest available 
range of deliberative inputs. 
This process will not be perfect, but it can be optimized by 
attending to the many emerging issues that have been identified 
with regard to equalizing participation in public discussions. The 
literature on internet-based democratic decision-making indicates 
that a period of experimentation or trial-and-error is inevitable and 
important; the internet is not automatically democratic regardless 
of the forms it takes (Ferdinand, 2000; Groshek, 2009; Lei, 2011). 
Initially, different approaches should be tried on different issues to 
discover what produces the broadest, global affective weighing of 
the issues involved. Although the internet brings its own media-
specific challenges to processes of deliberation, the bar has been set 
quite low by the current processes. Consequently, it should be 
possible to improve upon the existing standard, even if perfection is 
unachievable. 
Several procedures might be tried to address various challenges 
that have been identified in existing literatures on deficiencies in 
public deliberation (Irwin, 2001; Kerr et al., 2007; Molster et al., 
2011; PytlikZillig et al., 2011; Zavestoski et al., 2006). One difficulty 
is to gain input from a sufficient range of people, including those 
who are not highly educated or not accustomed to public 
contributions. A process of deliberate invitation can prod persons of 
different types of scientific expertise to participate where relevant 
(e.g. makers of flu vaccines, those who have to deliver flu vaccines 
"on the ground", those who have experienced biocontainment 
failures). Active invitation can also ensure inclusion of persons who 
are not subject-matter experts and who are not accustomed to 
public participation. The regular inclusion of such members of the 
“general public” may also stimulate the involvement of voluntary 
representatives through “bottom up” processes (e.g., members of 
the Grameen Bank board). Simultaneously, the level of interest can 
be taken as one measure of the trust peoples have in the decisions 
that are being made by the process. Decision-boards where 
processes routinely produce good decisions are likely to gather less 
interest than those where decisions are unbalanced, reflecting 
people’s choices about where they need to spend their scarce time 
(which enables an integration of authority with democratic process 
as suggested by Warren (1996)). 
Various literatures have identified the contributions of some 
persons to be prone to low ethos due to grammatical, vocabulary, or 
stylistic differences from expectations in formal public venues. To 
reduce such disadvantages, a volunteer corps of rhetoricians 
(including argumentation experts and composition instructors) 
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might assist such contributors in maximizing the effectiveness of 
their statements for a global audience. This also raises questions of 
choice of language. Translations into all languages would be 
pragmatically prohibitive, but versions in three or four languages 
could be maintained with translation assistance available for 
would-be contributors. 
Moderator(s) could be charged not only with issuing a broad 
scope of invitations, but also with tiering contributions by factors 
such as relevance and emotive effects. An effective discussion 
cannot be infinite in its scope (if you followed the "threads" on the 
Occupy Wall Street board, you will have a sense of this). Indeed, in 
venues where sneering, ad hominem attacks come to dominate, 
they tend to drive out other types of commentaries over time. This 
means that a "focal" tier of comments will probably need to be 
maintained. To mitigate the possibility that moderators might 
simply relegate any commentary with which they disagreed, the 
WHO should maintain at least two (perhaps more) threads or sites, 
one for primary attention, another relegated for secondary 
attention rather than deleted. If all commentary submitted is 
available for public scrutiny, the judgments of the moderator are 
transparent, and everyone has a publically accessible "say", even if 
not every commentary will be located in the same place. The 
peoples of the globe would ultimately determine by their reading 
preferences which tiers or threads received the greatest attention. 
The most repeated objection I have heard to this proposal is that 
multi-national corporations have the financial capacities to swamp 
such on-line discussions. While this may be true with a largely 
inactive global public, and will remain somewhat true even with a 
more active global public, that is hardly a disadvantage as 
compared to the present approach. As it currently stands, in most 
global decision-making processes, corporations and individuals rich 
in social, economic, political or intellectual capital are the only 
agents who have any real access to decision-makers. Our proposed 
internet discussion process adds to those voices, even if it would not 
delete the participation of the existing voices. The test of the 
process is not "Does it offer a perfect mode of decision-making" but 
merely "Does it have a good possibility of substantial improvement 
on what we now employ?" Any mildly broadened discussion process 
would leap the bar set by the current WHO process in important 
respects. 
On issues where part of the question is the release of sensitive 
information, dual-level reviews could be adopted. A first, closed-
door phase (with a wider body of experts) could make a preliminary 
determination. The public, which includes persons of a range of 
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expertise, could have input on who should be represented in the 
closed-door meeting. If those included in the meeting decide (as in 
the present case) that public disclosure is warranted, then a second 
level of public review can be undertaken before release. Although 
the public in such cases would not have all of the information for 
such a decision, they could judge the broad sufficiency of the expert 
process. To focus on publication, however, is something of a 
smokescreen or a "too little, too late" approach. More crucial would 
be a process to decide whether to spend public funds on such 
research before it ever generates potentially dangerous information 
or organisms. The information for such up-stream decisions 
appears typically to be available in the scientific record before such 
research is undertaken for any research that will itself be 
publishable. 
Some process for summarizing contributions may also be 
desirable, with partisans from different views invited to participate 
in a summary list of arguments for different aspects or positions. It 
may prove more valuable to produce competing summaries rather 
than a synthetic summary in many cases. Such summaries might 
themselves have a short commentary period before an identified 
closing date of a phase of a discussion that leads to a policy 
decision. One ideal might be to have a global vote on a proposal, but 
this is as yet not achievable, and many substantive questions would 
need to be settled before such a process arose. In the interim, voting 
delegates to world bodies such as the UN, IMF, WTO, etc., could be 
required to provide a response to the summary sheet as a part of 
their voting process. Although this would not guarantee that 
delegates have taken the summary documents seriously, or even 
read them, it would maximize the circulation of these documents 
among decision-makers (their staffs, at the least). 
In the current state of the world, there is no guarantee that such 
public deliberations or even WHO decisions will bind nation-state 
governments. However, at the present time we do not even know 
what an informed, global-scale deliberation would lead to as a 
matter of preference. Once we develop mechanisms for finding out 
what such preferences might look like, we will find that there is 
some influence on some governments and then seek ways to 
increase the impact of such articulations. 
CONCLUSION 
This article suggests that an appropriate understanding of the role 
of emotion and its relationship to decision-making in processes of 
public deliberation, even deliberation about technical or scientific 
subjects, reveals that major decisions about world health, such as 
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that made by the WHO on the “super-flu,” are employing sub-
standard decision processes. Human decision-making requires 
affective mental processes. No single human or small group of 
humans can embody all of the inputs relevant to the weightings 
required for maximally rich (and often even for minimally 
sufficient) decision-making for policy choices that have life-and-
death consequences on a global scale. Including the bio-terror and 
bio-containment experts in the “super-flu” meetings would have 
redressed some of the missing affect, but such experts could not 
have sufficiently represented the balance of fears (of naturally 
occurring vs. human-made flu) for different populations around the 
world. The risks and benefits are different in Indonesia and Egypt 
and Vietnam and the Netherlands. They are different because of the 
different risks of exposure, but also because of the different benefits 
of the biological research enterprise to the nations, and because of 
the different meanings of different causes of death (natural vs. 
inflicted by carelessness in experiments in other nations). Only a 
sustained, global-level deliberation can link up a sufficiently broad 
range of affects to process the relationship of all of these risks and 
benefits to all the world’s peoples. This essay thus indicates that 
developing the theory and practice of pathos in ways analogous to 
the developments in logos over the past two thousand years may 
prove to be similarly fruitful. 
Copyright © 2014 Celeste M. Condit 
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